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The Shared Origins of Embodiment
and Development
Peter J. Marshall1* , Troy M. Houser1 and Staci M. Weiss2
1 Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, United States, 2 University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
As a domain of study centering on the nature of the body in the functioning of the
individual organism, embodiment encompasses a diverse array of topics and questions.
One useful organizing framework places embodiment as a bridge construct connecting
three standpoints on the body: the form of the body, the body as actively engaged
in and with the world, and the body as lived experience. Through connecting these
standpoints, the construct of embodiment shows that they are not mutually exclusive:
inherent in form is the capacity for engagement, and inherent in engagement is a lived
perspective that confers agency and meaning. Here, we employ this framework to
underscore the deep connections between embodiment and development. We begin
with a discussion of the origins of multicellularity, highlighting how the evolution of
bodies was the evolution of development itself. The evolution of the metazoan (animal)
body is of particular interest, because most animals possess complex bodies with
sensorimotor capacities for perceiving and acting that bring forth a particular sort
of embodiment. However, we also emphasize that the thread of embodiment runs
through all living things, which share an organizational property of self-determination
that endows them with a specific kind of autonomy. This realization moves us away from
a Cartesian machine metaphor and instead puts an emphasis on the lived perspective
that arises from being embodied. This broad view of embodiment presents opportunities
to transcend the boundaries of individual disciplines to create a novel integrative vision
for the scientific study of development.
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Researchers interested in development occupy niches in various disciplines including biology,
psychology, neuroscience, education, and various parts of the social sciences. However, each type of
expert spends much of their time viewing developmental questions through a narrow disciplinary
lens. We suggest that new insights can be gained by employing the concept of embodiment as
a wide-angle lens that can reveal novel opportunities for connecting the study of development
across a diversity of domains of study. By embodiment, we refer to the nature of the body
in the functioning of the individual organism. We follow Overton (2008), who proposed that
“Embodiment is a concept of synthesis, a bridge that joins broad areas of inquiry into a unified
whole” (p. 3). He further suggested that one way to view embodiment is as a bridge between three
standpoints: the form of the body (in the sense of bodily morphology), the body as actively engaged
with the world, and the body as lived experience (see also Johnson, 2007).
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Here, we take a broad view, framed by the three standpoints of
Overton (2008), to highlight how embodiment and development
are deeply intertwined, with the hope of encouraging
developmental scientists to engage with the implications of
an embodied approach. We begin with the evolutionary origins
of bodily form and why and how bodies arose. Given that the
body does not exist separately from the actions and activities
of the individual, we then move to consider the capacity for
embodied engagement by the developing organism. The origins
of the metazoan (animal) body are of particular interest, given
that the evolution of animals involved the emergence of complex
bodies with nervous systems and sensorimotor capacities that
bring forth a particular sort of embodiment. However, we also
emphasize that the thread of embodiment runs through all
living things: From single cells, through simple multicellular
entities, to the more complex bodies of animals, plants, and
fungi, living things share an organizational property of self-
determination that confers them with a form of autonomy
which is fundamentally different from nonliving things. As such,
living systems have a viewpoint or lived perspective that arises
through their organization and the nature of their embodiment.
This realization moves us away from a Cartesian separation of
life and mind and instead puts an emphasis on the embodied
perspective of the organism that arises through the nature
of the organization of living things. It also underscores how
embodiment as a bridge construct can lead to a synthesis of
perspectives on the body, challenging us to develop new lines of
interdisciplinary developmental research.
THE HOW AND WHY OF BODIES
Although there cannot be a single explanation for why bodies
arose, the range of opportunities that emerge from living at
a larger scale likely influenced the evolution of the processes
involved in the development of bodies. Simply put, the size
of unicellular organisms imposes constraints that can only be
overcome by becoming multicellular. Sterling and Laughlin
(2017) discuss the unicellular eukaryote Paramecium, which
ingests other, smaller microorganisms, and uses cilia for
locomotion. They note that the behavioral repertoire and capacity
for learning of Paramecium are limited by its size (0.05–
0.30 mm), such that “the cell is still so small that locomotion must
be slow, and the environment remains so evanescent that richer
behavior and longer memory offer no advantage” (p. 20). From
this perspective, greater size is a route towards richer and more
flexible behavioral capacities, at the same time allowing access to
new niches and energy flows–although this in turn also exposes
the organism to new vulnerabilities.
The evolution of multicellularity is a large and complex
topic that can only be touched on here. One key distinction
is between simple forms of multicellularity such as filaments,
clusters, balls, or sheets of cells, and the more complex
bodies of animals, plants, and fungi. Simple multicellularity
has evolved many times across the domain of eukaryotes, and
can even be found in some prokaryotes such as cyanobacteria
(Bonner, 1998). What sets more complex bodies apart is that in
addition to cells adhering together, there is elaborate intercellular
communication, differentiation of cells into different types
and tissues, and the involvement of programmed cell death
(Knoll, 2011). Behind these general commonalities are important
differences in the specific evolutionary and developmental
processes that shape multicellularity in animals, plants, and fungi
(Niklas and Newman, 2020). For present purposes, the main
point is that is that considering the evolution of complex bodies
brings the concept of development to center stage. Organisms
that exhibit simple multicellularity may show changes across
their life cycle, as do some unicellular organisms (Driks, 2002;
Huang and Hull, 2017). At some level, such changes may be
construed as developmental, although they do not involve the
differentiation and integration of multiple types of cell, intricate
communication between cells, or the death of cells as part
of the developmental process. In this sense, the evolution of
complex bodies–which involves all of these characteristics–was
the evolution of development itself.
It is notable that the outlines of the physiological processes
involved in cell adhesion, cell–cell signaling, and cellular
differentiation can be seen in the physiology of unicellular
organisms, suggesting that the evolution of development did not
involve the wholesale generation of new mechanisms (Grosberg
and Strathmann, 2007; Sebé-Pedrós et al., 2017). Recent lines of
research have extended this line of thinking to consider how the
capacities of single cells can shed light on the building blocks of
cognition (Levin et al., 2021; Lyon et al., 2021). We raise these
points to emphasize that reaching a deeper understanding of
embodiment and development involves a wide-angle outlook that
extends across the breadth of living systems, even down to the
level of single-celled organisms.
DEVELOPMENTAL AND EVOLUTIONARY
PATHWAYS TO COMPLEX BODIES
One key aspect of the development of complex bodies is the
differentiation of cells into different types, as parts of bodily
subsystems (e.g., tissues and organs) that become integrated in
support of the functioning of the whole organism. In turn, the
extent of cellular differentiation in a body is tied to increasing
size. Many simple multicellular eukaryotes are so small that each
cell can be in contact with the external medium, but this is simply
not possible in larger bodies. Beyond a certain (very small) size,
wider considerations arise around metabolism and transport,
which in turn require cells to take on specialized functions
(Knoll, 2011; Brunet and King, 2017). In the case of animals, a
range of abilities and functions arise through such specialization,
including coordinated locomotion, feeding, waste excretion, and
reproduction, as well as sensing of the environment–including
registering the presence of other organisms.
Understanding the processes that influence the number of cell
types in a body is an active area of research (Bush et al., 2017).
The differentiation of cells into different types allows bodies to
exist at a higher level of complexity than the individual cells of
which they are comprised (Michod and Roze, 1997), with the
relative complexity of a body reflected by the number of cell types
that develop within it (Márquez-Zacarías et al., 2020). Within
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the realm of animals, some vertebrates may have as many as
250 different types of cells, while animals in basal phyla such
as Cnidarians (jellyfish and corals) have far fewer. The pathway
to bodily complexification in animals arose in part through the
evolution of gastrulation, a series of changes in early embryonic
development that gives rise to differentiated layers of cells inside
the blastocyst. Although specific details are debated (Nakanishi
et al., 2014; King and Rokas, 2017), the evolution of this phase of
embryonic development laid the foundation for complex bodies
and for the kind of embodiment that accompanies animal life.
Insights into the evolutionary origins of more complex animal
bodies can be gleaned from studying basal animal phyla that
have relatively simple bodies, without judgements about the
nature or value of complexity (Dunn et al., 2015). Cnidarians are
particularly informative in this respect: They have some degree of
cellular differentiation, have multiple types of tissue within their
body, and they have a nervous system, although they lack a brain.
They also differ from more complex animals in having radial
symmetry, rather than the bilateral symmetry that characterizes
almost all other animals. In this respect, it is notable that the
bodies of Cnidarians arise from two germ layers (endoderm
and ectoderm) that differentiate during gastrulation, whereas
more complex animal bodies arise from three germ layers. The
evolution of the third germ layer (mesoderm) as a product of
gastrulation was associated with a rise in bodily complexity, not
only in terms of facilitating an increase in the number of cell
types, but also by enabling the development and evolution of
major changes in body morphology such as body cavities and
bilateral symmetry (Carroll, 2001).
THE ENGAGED BODY
Discussions of the evolution of the animal body often emphasize
the important of the “Cambrian explosion” that began around
535 million years ago and left a burst of animal bodies in the
fossil record. These bodies were variations on a particular body
configuration involving bilateral symmetry (with an anterior
and posterior end), segmentation, and specialized appendages.
While the origins of this configuration predate the Cambrian,
the evolution of the metazoan body shifted animals towards
a new way of being in the world. The evolution of animal
bodies was accompanied by an increase in the complexity and
flexibility in the capacity to act, supported by the evolution of
nervous systems, ultimately including brains. As multicellular
animals became larger, nervous systems may have first arisen
for purposes of internal coordination among cells, prior to the
evolution of brains (Keijzer and Arnellos, 2017; Arendt, 2021).
Networks of neurons then became incorporated into newly
evolving sensorimotor systems that became connected to ways
of moving and acting. This connection thus takes us from the
first standpoint of bodily morphology to the standpoint of the
engaged body and the notion of embodied action.
One key tenet of embodiment is that action is not the
“output” of cognitive processing that is part of a stepwise
perception-cognition-action sequence. Indeed, the origins of the
field of embodied cognition can be traced to dissatisfaction
with this mechanical view (Varela et al., 1991). Embodiment
presents a distinct challenge to a view of the organism as a
passive recipient of “information” with prespecified meaning that
is then subjected to computational processing, followed by a
behavioral response. Embodied treatments instead emphasize the
active nature of the individual organism, with recent accounts
focusing on how agency arises through the prospective nature of
cognitive processes (Clark, 2013). This emphasis on anticipatory,
future-oriented processes takes us from a reactive, feedforward,
homeostatic view of organismic functioning to a view in which
allostasis is the predominant mode (Sterling, 2012). One related
emphasis is on the evolutionary primacy of reafferent processes
in which sensing the world became intertwined with responsivity
to the organism’s own actions (Jékely et al., 2021). A further
stipulation of embodiment is that meaning is not prespecified
in information that is “picked up” by the organism, but rather
that embodied action transforms the objective world into the
world that the individual experiences (Overton, 2008). Meaning
is therefore shaped by the embodiment of the organism, including
the kind of body that it has and the nature and development of its
capacities for action (Marshall, 2016).
EMBODIMENT AND THE MEANING IN
LIFE
The evolution of complex animal bodies had particular
implications for embodiment, with the capacity for more
sophisticated action bringing a new way of being in the
world. Evolving nervous systems facilitated the coordination and
intertwining of moving, sensing, and acting as a single unit,
establishing a new kind of “body-self ” (Jékely et al., 2021). The
distinction between self and non-self became sharper, bringing to
the organism a new kind of perspective or point of view. However,
although the evolution of the animal body represented a new
chapter in the book of embodiment, it did not begin an entirely
new volume. By virtue of the particular organizational properties
of living systems, the thread of embodiment runs through all
living things. This fundamental point features prominently in
a line of theorizing around embodiment known as autopoietic
enactivism that has its origins in the work of Maturana and
Varela (1987; Varela, 1979). In turn, this line of thinking has
connections to systems-organizational frameworks in biology
(Rosen, 1991) as well as to philosophical lines of inquiry that
focus on the particular self-determining properties of living
things (Merleau-Ponty, 1967).
The autopoietic enactivist view begins from the premise
that living things actively self-maintain themselves through the
constant regeneration of the conditions that are necessary to
sustain their material existence. This organizational feature of life
was termed autopoiesis by Maturana and Varela, who focused
on the individual cell as a unit enclosed by a semipermeable
membrane that acts as a boundary between the inside of the
cell and the surrounding medium. The inside of the cell is
characterized by chemical reactions and transformations that
both generate the components of which the cell is composed and
maintain the organization of the cell (its boundary and contents)
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in the face of entropic tendencies to dissolve that organization.
What then defines living beings as unities is their autopoietic
organization, such that “it is in this autopoietic organization
that they become real and specify themselves at the same time”
(Maturana and Varela, 1987, p. 48). This self-specification confers
on living organisms a particular kind of autonomy that has been
termed constitutive autonomy by Froese et al. (2007), in contrast
to behavioral autonomy, where the identity of the system is
imposed externally by an operator or observer. There are clear
connections here to the teleology of Kant, who proposed that
living things exist for themselves in a way that is different from
nonliving entities. As framed by Witherington (2014), from the
Kantian perspective the living organism “serves as its own cause,
organizing and producing itself such that it causes and results
from itself. In this way, living systems constitute natural ends or
purposes” (p. 27; see also Farnsworth, 2018).
Returning to the framework of Overton (2008), these
considerations take us from the standpoints of bodily
morphology and the engaged body to the standpoint of the
body as lived experience. In short, constitutive autonomy
confers the individual organism with a perspective that arises
naturally from the organization of living things and the
way that this organization comes about. This notion of the
organism having an individual perspective then raises questions
about phenomenology–questions that have historically been
pushed aside by the computational machine metaphor of the
organism that originated in the split ontology of Descartes.
The machine metaphor does not allow the question of “What
is it like to be a living thing?” to even arise. In contrast,
embodiment allows us to consider living beings as having
what Maturana and Varela called a “biological phenomenology”
that arises through their organizational properties. In this
view, biological phenomenology does not go against physical
phenomenology: There is no split. Maturana and Varela simply
propose that as different classes of unities, living beings and
nonliving things such as rocks or snowflakes specify particular
phenomenologies. The organization that characterizes nonliving
unities is not autopoietic, thus precluding them from having
a perspective in the sense of the biological phenomenology of
living systems that arises through their inherent autopoietic
self-specification. This line of thinking remains an important
background framework for studying the emergence of agency
and autonomy in living systems, including research that probes
the interface of mesoscale physical and physiochemical processes
that are common to nonliving and living things and agentive
behaviors of cellular systems that are unique to living organisms
(Arias Del Angel et al., 2020).
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENTAL
SCIENCE
In this brief perspective piece, we have outlined a wide-angle view
of embodiment that draws together work across developmental
and evolutionary biology, developmental psychology, and
embodied cognitive science. Considering the evolution of
bodies highlights how embodiment is not an add-on to
the study of development, but rather that the origins of
development are the origins of embodiment. In turn, bodily
morphology cannot be divorced from the active agency of the
individual, such that embodied engagement of the developing
organism comes to the fore. Within developmental science, this
emphasis recalls Piagetian notions of schemes that are shaped
through assimilation and accommodation, with the process
of equilibration moving the developing organism from one
world of meaning to another (Di Paolo, 2019). A renewed
focus on these ideas, combined with an emphasis on the
self-determination of living systems, can return the study
of organization and systems to the center of developmental
science (Marshall, 2013, 2014). In particular, the interplay
between organization (or structure) and process must be deeply
considered (Witherington and Heying, 2015). We note that
these themes are emphasized in the metatheoretical approach of
process-relational developmental systems theory (Overton and
Lerner, 2014; Overton, 2015). This approach places embodiment
as a core developmental construct, and is founded in a
relational worldview that rejects the separation of life and
mind that originated with Descartes yet continues to influence
contemporary cognitive science.
A further implication of living things as self-determined
concerns the perspective of the developing organism. With
respect to human development, the view of embodiment
outlined here speaks to the importance of an intraindividual,
lifespan developmental approach, which still remains to be
widely considered in contemporary theorizing. It also leads
to a variety of questions about the embodied origins of the
self (and self-other relations) and about the development
of agency in relation to the construction of embodied
meaning (Marshall, 2016). Adopting this multidisciplinary,
broad view of embodiment presents distinct challenges,
but also provides a valuable opportunity for developmental
scientists to transcend the boundaries of their individual
fields of study to create a new vision for the scientific
study of development.
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